Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk by Tu, Anh T. & Beghin, John C.
CARD Working Papers CARD Reports and Working Papers
12-2006
Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration,
and Invasive Species Risk
Anh T. Tu
Iowa State University
John C. Beghin
Iowa State University, beghin@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Environmental Health and Protection Commons, and the International Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the CARD Reports and Working Papers at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in CARD Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more
information, please contact digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tu, Anh T. and Beghin, John C., "Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species Risk" (2006). CARD
Working Papers. 441.
http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/441
Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration, and Invasive Species
Risk
Abstract
We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of two-way
trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural trade. Multilateral
integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading partners. Multilateral trade
integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted by unilateral trade opening under the
classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework because domestic production (the base susceptible to
damages) is likely to increase with expanding export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner
characterized by relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages
via expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a stylized
model of the world wheat market.
Keywords
exotic pest, intra-industry trade, invasive species, liberalization, trade cost, trade integration, trade protection,
two-way trade
Disciplines
Agricultural and Resource Economics | Agricultural Economics | Environmental Health and Protection |
International Economics
This article is available at Iowa State University Digital Repository: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/card_workingpapers/441
 
 
 
 
 
Intra-Industry Trade, Multilateral Trade Integration,  
and Invasive Species Risk 
 
 
Anh T. Tu and John C. Beghin 
 
 
Working Paper 06-WP 439 
December 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Center for Agricultural and Rural Development 
Iowa State University 
Ames, Iowa 50011-1070 
www.card.iastate.edu 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Anh Tu is assistant professor, Department of Economics, Foreign Trade University, Hanoi, Vietnam. John 
Beghin is professor and Marlin Cole Chair in the Department of Economics at Iowa State University.  
 
The authors thank Harvey Lapan, GianCarlo Moschini and Rajesh Singh for comments on earlier drafts, 
and Denis McGee for providing invasive species information. Earlier versions were presented at the ISU 
Heartland Environmental and Resource Economics Workshop, the AAEA Meetings, the Annual Global 
Economic Analysis Conference, and the AARES meetings. We thank their participants for comments. 
John Beghin acknowledges support from the Marlin Cole endowment at Iowa State University. 
 
This paper is available online on the CARD Web site: www.card.iastate.edu. Permission is granted to 
excerpt or quote this information with appropriate attribution to the authors. 
 
Questions or comments about the contents of this paper should be directed to John Beghin, 578 Heady 
Hall, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa 50011-1070; Ph: (515) 294-5811; Fax: (515) 294-6336; E-mail: 
beghin@iastate.edu.  
 
Iowa State University does not discriminate on the basis of race, color, age, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, gender 
identity, sex, marital status, disability, or status as a U.S. veteran. Inquiries can be directed to the Director of Equal Opportunity and 
Diversity, 3680 Beardshear Hall, (515) 294-7612.  
 
  
 
 
Abstract 
 
 
We analyze the linkage between protectionism and invasive species (IS) hazard in the context of 
two-way trade and multilateral trade integration, two major features of real-world agricultural 
trade. Multilateral integration includes the joint reduction of tariffs and trade costs among trading 
partners. Multilateral trade integration is more likely to increase damages from IS than predicted 
by unilateral trade opening under the classic Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) framework 
because domestic production (the base susceptible to damages) is likely to increase with 
expanding  export markets. A country integrating its trade with a partner characterized by 
relatively higher tariff and trade costs is also more likely to experience increased IS damages via 
expanded domestic production for the same reason. We illustrate our analytical results with a 
stylized model of the world wheat market.  
 
Keywords: exotic pest, intra-industry trade, invasive species, liberalization, trade cost, trade 
integration, trade protection, two-way trade. 
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1. Introduction 
Our study resides at the confluence of international trade, the environment, and sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) issues. International trade is an important conduit of environmental change 
(Copeland and Taylor; Beghin, Roland-Holst, and van der Mensbrugghe). The recent literature 
emerging on the triple interface of trade, the environment, and SPS focuses on accidental 
introductions of exotic or invasive species (IS), such as pests, weeds, and viruses, by way of 
trade (Perrings, Williamson and Dalmazzone; and Mumford). The trade-SPS-environment 
interface is almost inherent to the economics of IS since trade is a major vector of propagation. 
Many papers in this emerging literature are focused on the “right” criteria to use or the optimal 
environmental policy response to the hazard of IS (Sumner; and Binder) and around quarantine 
as a legitimate policy response to phytosanitary risk (Cook and Fraser; and Anderson, McRae, 
and Wilson). Our paper contributes to this new literature on trade and IS risk in the specific 
context of agricultural markets and trade and looks at the impact of multilateral trade integration 
on IS risk. Integration is defined here as the joint lowering of both tariffs and other trade costs 
between two or more trading partners. 
 Agricultural imports have always been an important conduit for biological invasions. 
Despite the Uruguay Round Agreement of the World Trade Organization (WTO), protectionism 
remains significant in agriculture, and its reduction in future trade agreements will influence 
agricultural trade patterns and associated IS damages. Elucidating the impact of the structure of 
agricultural protectionism on IS hazards and damages is an important issue. In a standard one-
way trade Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson (HOS) model, Costello and McAusland show that 
lowering agricultural tariffs could actually lower the damage from exotic species, even though 
the volume of trade increases and the rate of IS introduction rises, because an increase in imports 
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results in a reduced domestic agricultural output. Thus the crop volume susceptible and available 
for damage and the land area potentially affected by the pest are reduced and consequently 
damages can be reduced as well, leading to an ambiguous effect of trade on IS damages.  
Our paper extends and builds upon the inquiry of Costello and McAusland, with major 
departures. We study the linkage between protection and damages from IS in the context of two-
way trade and trade integration. Intra-industry trade characterizes agricultural trade patterns in 
the real world.1 For example, wheat is a differentiated commodity, with most trading countries 
importing and exporting wheat (see Table 1) (Larue; Mitchell and Mielke). Two-way trade 
patterns hold even more for more broadly defined commodities such as coarse grains, as shown 
in Table 2. Because they can cross grain types, many pests and IS represent a risk for several 
types of grains and coarse grains, hence the relevance of two-way trade for broader commodity 
definitions. The HOS framework has limited empirical relevance in this context.  
We further depart from the previous analysis by considering multilateral trade 
integration. Trade integration by way of policy reform is occurring mainly in the context of 
WTO multilateral or regional reforms (e.g., Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, NAFTA, 
and Free Trade of the Americas). Seldom do countries engage in unilateral trade liberalization, 
but rather, they commit to jointly reduce their protection through regional or multilateral 
agreements (Bhagwati). Beyond the joint lowering of policy barriers, trade integration is 
occurring with a progressive lowering of transaction costs between trade partners. Costs 
associated with trade, although still significant, have been falling dramatically for both exports 
and imports through cheaper transportation, cheaper refrigeration, insurance, and so forth. Joint 
                                                          
1 We use intra-industry trade and two-way trade interchangeably and as meaning the simultaneous import and export 
of a differentiated good. Similarly, we use exotic pest and invasive species interchangeably. 
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tariff reduction and the joint lowering of other trade costs (on both sides of any border) have 
similar qualitative effects on trade, production, and consumption and can be parameterized 
similarly.  
We consider the effects of trade integration on expected IS damage in a two-way trade 
context. In the perfect competition benchmark case, we find that trade integration is much more 
likely to increase expected damage from exotic species in our two-way trade model, as compared 
with unilateral liberalization in the HOS paradigm. Imperfect competition often characterizes 
agricultural trade. We investigate variations in market structure. The influence of market 
structure is marginal. Trade integration increases IS damages in the two-way trade context, 
irrespective of market structure assumptions. The ambiguity raised by Costello and McAusland 
is much reduced in our more realistic context of joint integration and two-way trade. We 
illustrate our results with an application to wheat trade and associated IS. 
2. Stylized facts on grains trade integration and associated IS risk  
In this section, we briefly discuss the nature of wheat trade patterns and integration with 
emphasis on that of the United States and Canada. Similar patterns hold for many countries and 
many commodities, although tariffs and protection in agriculture remain significantly higher in 
many parts of the world (Aksoy). We also look at IS risk associated with wheat. 
 Table 1 summarizes bilateral wheat trade between the United States, Canada, and the 
“rest of the world” in the marketing year of July 2001 through June 2002. There is a large two-
way trade between the US and Canada: 98% of US wheat imports come from Canada, while 
25% of Canadian wheat imports are from the US. For a broader picture of grain trade, Table 2 
highlights the bilateral trade on coarse grains between these three countries in the same period of 
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time and illustrates that two-way trade is even more obvious in coarse grains than in wheat trade. 
To remain parsimonious, we focus on wheat trade between these countries. 
Tables 3 and 4 show that trade policy barriers have been falling during the past 25 years. 
The United States adopted the Harmonized System (HS) nomenclature and shifted from charging 
wheat imports based on food and feed to durum and other in 1988 (Wainio). Tariffs on wheat in 
these two countries have been falling remarkably. They become quite negligible, especially those 
of Canada. Hence, on the policy front, notable trade integration has been occurring between 
these neighboring countries. 
Trade integration goes beyond tariff reductions. Transaction costs are associated with 
trading across borders. The underlying problem addressed in our paper is even more relevant 
because trade costs other than tariffs remain substantial, although they have been falling over 
time. Anderson and van Wincoop review the recent literature on trade cost and provide a rough 
estimate of “representative” trade costs for industrialized countries including transportation and 
distribution costs, which are a staggering 170% in ad valorem equivalent of the ex-factory unit 
cost. The costs break down as follows: 21% transportation costs, 44% border-related trade 
barriers, and 55% retail and wholesale distribution costs. The 21% transport cost includes both 
directly measured freight costs and a 9% tax equivalent of the time value of goods in transit. 
Anderson and van Wincoop’s overall representative estimate of policy barriers for industrialized 
countries is about 8%, which is low and reflects the successive rounds of the WTO and its GATT 
predecessor to liberalized manufacturing trade. Agricultural trade has been included in the last 
and ongoing WTO rounds. A rough breakdown of the 44% number for border-related barriers is 
as follows: an 8% policy barrier; a 7% language barrier, a 14% currency barrier (from the use of 
different currencies), a 6% informational cost barrier, and a 3% security barrier for rich 
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countries. Inferred transaction costs appear, on average, to dominate the effect of trade policies, 
even if the 170% figure appears somewhat inflated.  
A number of studies have found that transportation costs have been falling over time 
because of cheaper rates and reduced time of transportation. Bitzan et al. simulate the changes in 
US rail rates over the 1981-2000 time period relative to 1981 as shown in Figure 1, for three 
commodities of interest (wheat, corn, and soybeans). The figure shows large percentage 
decreases in rates since 1981 and some tapering since the mid-1990s. Hummels reports a world-
wide value for transportation costs as measured by ratio of CIF to FOB valuation of trade as 
shown in Figure 2. The figure suggests that CIF/FOB transportation costs have declined 
precipitously—from 13% of trade to around 3% from 1949 to 1995. However, the measurement 
of transportation costs using importer CIF/FOB ratios is incomplete and suffers from quality 
problems, and inference based on these data has to be carefully qualified.2 Despite these pitfalls 
regarding the magnitude of trade costs and their measurement, the evidence strongly suggests 
that trade costs have fallen but remain large.  
Table 5 summarizes information about wheat pests and insects in the United States with 
their economic importance, which ranges between low, moderate, and high. The table was 
constructed with information from the Crop Protection Compendium (CABI Compendium). It 
shows the origin of a lot of pests and insects, reflecting the exotic nature of these species. For 
example, Russian wheat aphid was first found in Russia in 1912 and was first reported in Texas 
in 1986. Karnal bunt in wheat was first reported in Pakistan in 1909 and was recently found in 
the southwestern United States (in 1996). The table also includes the likelihood of seedborne 
                                                          
2 Small discrepancies in importer/exporter reports yield large changes in CIF/FOB ratios. Also, importer/exporter 
reports of bilateral trade flow may vary for reasons unrelated to shipping costs. More troubling, for many pairings, 
only one partner reports data, and these constraints force the IMF to “construct” CIF/FOB ratios. 
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incidence, and the possibility of seed transmission and seed treatment of these species. The 
common bunt, for example, can be transmitted through seeds, but seed treatment is available, 
which lightens its economic impact. An important feature of this table is that it gives some 
measures of economic impacts of these species at different times and places. These impacts are 
usually measured in terms of yield losses and often recorded only when the effects were severe. 
In brief, the table brings some facts about possible considerable effects on wheat yields of these 
species. However, the findings of Pimentel et al. support losses arising in many ways beyond 
yield loss and affecting an array of potential economic agents summarized in the estimated 
expected loss. Losses are often associated with the size of the crop or land under cultivation but 
go beyond yield loss.  
Therefore, in our conceptual model, we consider a central case with general IS damages 
linked to domestic production but not specific to loss in yield. IS risk is increasing in imports, 
and damages are increasing in the size of domestic grain production. Damages could affect the 
representative consumer through loss of biodiversity associated with the crops or regions in 
which crops are grown, for example. The yield-specific effect of IS is later used in the calibrated 
model of the wheat illustration as a tractable indicator of losses. 
3. Multilateral trade integration and invasive species risk in a two-way trade model 
Trade model 
Assume that there are two countries, Home and Foreign, and that each country has one industry 
producing a given commodity. The industries in the two countries are perfectly competitive. The 
Home industry produces output x for domestic consumption and output x* for Foreign 
consumption. Similarly, the Foreign industry produces output y for export to Home, and output 
y* for its own market.  
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Assume that Home good and Foreign good are imperfect substitutes in each market such 
that the Home demands for domestic good and imports are 
(1) ( , ) (1 )x y x x x yx p p a b p kp τ= − + + ,  
and  
(2) ( , ) (1 )x y y y y xy p p a b p kpτ= − + + , 
where ( , )X Yp p  are prices of Home and Foreign goods in the Home market, and ( , *)τ τ  are the 
Home and Foreign ad-valorem tariffs on imports. For simplicity, we assume that tariffs embody 
all trade costs, as they lead to a similar parameterization (a price wedge between buyers and 
sellers across borders). All parameters are assumed to be positive and so is the expression 
xb b k− 2y  by integrability of a demand system derived by maximizing a quasi-linear utility under 
budget constraint (see Appendix 1).  
Similarly, Foreign demands for its own domestic good and imports from Home are 
(3) * * * * * **( , ) * (1 *)x y y y y xy p p a b p k p τ= − + + ,  
and 
(4) * * * * * **( , ) (1 *) *x y x x x yx p p a b p k pτ= − + + . 
Again, all parameters are assumed to be positive and so is the expression * *xb b k− 2y* .  
 The Home and Foreign firms’ unit costs are c and c*, respectively. Tariffs are expressed 
in ad valorem rate of unit cost or price. Assume that firms charge constant average-cost pricing 
in both markets and make zero profit. That is, *x xp p c= = , and * *y yp p c= = .  
 Then, the equilibrium sales, represented by the corresponding capital letters, are 
(1’) * (1 )x xX a b c kc τ= − + + ,  
(2’) *(1 )y yY a b c kcτ= − + + , 
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(3’) * ** * * (1 *)y yY a b c k c τ= − + + ,  
and 
(4’) * ** (1 *) * *x xX a b c k cτ= − + + ,  
with ( , *) ( ) *( *)Q X Xτ τ τ τ= +  denoting total Home production. Comparative-statics of these 
variables with respect to policies and evaluated at equilibrium lead to the following intermediate 
results: 
(i) * / 0X τ∂ ∂ = , ** / * 0xX b cτ∂ ∂ = − < ; 
(ii) / * 0X c kτ∂ ∂ = > , / * 0X τ∂ ∂ = ; 
(iii) / * 0Q Q c kτ τ= ∂ ∂ = > , * */ * 0xQ Q cbτ τ= ∂ ∂ = − < ;  
and 
(iv) / * 0yY Y c bτ τ= ∂ ∂ = − < , * / * 0Y Yτ τ= ∂ ∂ = . 
Modeling the interface of IS damages and policy 
The expected damages caused by IS are [ ( , )] ( ) ( )E D Y Q Y F Qρ= , where ρ  is the rate of 
successful IS introduction to Home country, and F is the IS damages to Home given total 
production Q.3 We assume that ρ  is increasing in the volume of imports Y ( 0Yρ > ). Damages 
are called augmented (neutral, diminished) if they increase (remain unchanged, decrease) as the 
level of agricultural activity increases (Costello and McAusland), that is, if 0QF > ( 0QF = , 
0QF < ) with the subscript denoting the derivative of F with respect to Q. The augmented 
damages are the most frequent case in the real world. 
                                                          
3 In an earlier version we followed Costello and McAusland’s elaborate approach to modeling IS risks. But both 
approaches yield identical qualitative results. In Costello and McAusland, an additional component in the expected 
damages is the probability that an introduced species establishes a viable population in Home. Damages are a sum of 
discounted damages over time from successful IS introduction linked to imports. 
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 We now consider the effects of trade integration on expected damages in equilibrium. 
Under the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, WTO member countries have had to 
convert quantitative restrictions on imports into bound tariffs, reduce these tariffs over an 
implementation period by a minimum percent change, and open their markets to imports under 
the minimum access provision. Using this type of reform as a motivation, we parameterize 
integration into our model as a joint proportional reduction of tariffs inclusive of trade costs. 
Assume / * / *d dτ τ τ τ κ= = − , i.e., a proportional decrease of tariffs, where κ  is any arbitrary 
positive fraction. 
 To understand the effect of trade integration on the damage from exotic species, we seek 
the sign of the total derivative: 
(5) 
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ]
* *
*
* *
*  by intermediate result (iv)
Q Y
Q Y
dED F Q d Q d F Y d Y d
F Q d Q d F Y d
τ τ τ τ
τ τ τ
ρ τ τ ρ τ τ
ρ τ τ ρ τ
= + + +
= + + . 
A lowering of tariffs has 3 effects on expected damages: an increase in the incidence of 
successful IS introduction via larger imports, and expanded damages via larger production for 
exports, and a reduction in damages via a contraction of production destined for domestic 
consumption.  
Using / * / *d dτ τ τ τ κ= = −  where 0κ >  and results (i)-(iv), we get 
(6) [ ] [ ]*( ) ( ) * ( )Q YdED F Q Q F Yτ τ τρ κ τ κ τ ρ κ τ= − + − + −  
 ( ) ** *Q Y y Q xc F k F b c F bκ τ ρ ρ τ ρ⎡ ⎤= − − −⎣ ⎦ . 
Hence, ( ) *0 * * 0Q Y y Q xdED c F k F b c F bκ τ ρ ρ τ ρ> >⎡ ⎤⇔ − − −⎣ ⎦< < . 
Define 0
Y Y
Y
ρε ρ ρ≡ >  and 0QF Q
QF
F
ε >≡ < , and rewrite the expression above to get 
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(7) **0
*Y Q
x
F
y y
bY k cdED
F b c bρ
τε ε τ
⎡ ⎤> >⇔ −⎢ ⎥< < ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. 
This finding is stated in result 1. 
Result 1: Given the demand structure as specified in equations (1)-(4), trade integration 
( / * / *d dτ τ τ τ κ= = − ) increases (decreases) the expected damages if and only if the elasticity 
of the rate of successful IS introduction with respect to volume of imports is higher (lower) than 
ε  where **
*Q
x
F
y y
Y k c b
F b c b
τε ε τ
⎡ ⎤≡ −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 . 
The critical value ε  depends on the elasticity of the conditional damages with respect to total 
domestic production; the relative unit costs; the relative tariffs; the imports and total production 
in equilibrium; and demand parameters *xb , yb , and k. 
 For trade integration to decrease the expected damages requires that 
**
*Y Q
x
F
y y
Y k c b
F b c bρ
τε ε τ
⎡ ⎤< −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
. Assuming that damages are augmented ( 0QF > ), and since 
0Yρ > , this condition requires that 
*
* * ˆ
x
c k
c b
τ ττ < ≡ , which is equivalent to having Home 
production falling with integration.4 This is a necessary condition. The response of Home 
production to the trade reform is represented by ( )**dQ Q Qτ τκ τ τ= − + . Hence, by comparative 
statics results stated earlier, we have 
* *
* *0  
x
Q c kdQ
Q cb
τ
τ
τ
τ⇔ − =
> >
< <
. We have 0dQ <  if and only 
                                                          
4 This is true because *
*
*
x
y y
k c b
b c b
τ
τ−  has to be positive. 
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if 
*
* * ˆ =
x
c k
cb
τ ττ < . Again, this is a necessary condition for reduction of damages caused by IS 
due to trade integration. By equation (7), we have a sufficient condition equivalent to 
Yρε ε<  , 
which is 
* *
* * Y
Q
y
x F x
bc k Q
c b Y b
ρετ ττ ε
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟< − ≡⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 . The latter means that multilateral trade integration 
decreases the expected damages if and only if the relative initial tariff (the ratio between foreign 
and domestic initial tariffs) is lower than critical value τ . Since ˆτ τ< , we see that not only must 
total production contract but it has to fall enough such that effects of the reduction of production 
on total damages offset the effects of the increase of imports on total damages. This is an 
intuitive result. 
 In contrast, by means of (7) and still assuming that damages are augmented, we then have 
a necessary and sufficient condition in terms of the relative initial tariffs for trade integration to 
increase the expected damages from IS:  
(8) 
* *
* * Y
Q
y
x F x
bc k Q
c b Y b
ρετ ττ ε
⎞⎛ ⎟⎜> − ≡⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 .  
 Further, and for sake of intuition, we assume symmetric costs of the two countries; that 
is, c = c*. Then (8) becomes 
* *
* Y
Q
y
x F x
bk Q
b Y b
ρετ ωτ ε> − ≡ . It is worth noting that 1ω < . Result 2 
follows directly from this argument. 
Result 2: Given the demand structure as specified in equations (1)-(4), and assuming symmetric 
costs, multilateral trade integration, always increases expected damages if (a) Home pre-reform 
tariff is not higher than foreign pre-reform tariff or if (b) Home pre-reform tariff is higher than 
Foreign pre-reform tariff but not substantially, so that * 1τω τ< < .  
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Condition (a) holds because * 1ττ τ ωτ≤ ⇒ ≥ >* . Note also in case (b), the condition is more 
likely to hold for (i) large *xb  and yb , and small k; (ii) small Yρε  and large QFε  in equilibrium; 
and (iii) small Q and large Y in equilibrium. This result suggests that a relatively open country 
with lower trade cost/protection further integrating its trade with a partner with higher 
protection/trade cost will face increase expected damages, other things being equal. We note that 
the cost symmetry assumption could be obtained by simple normalization (c = c*= 1). Condition 
1τω τ< <*  can be further simplified with further restrictions imposed on the demand structure 
across the two countries.  
Trade integration and IS risks: Two-way trade versus one-way trade 
We want to compare the reform-induced damages from IS in the two-way trade context to the 
outcome in the one-way trade cum unilateral opening case. The one-way trade context can be 
interpreted in our framework as the case when the Home firm’s export X* to the Foreign market 
does not exist.5 Therefore, the demand system is characterized only by equations (1), (2), and (4). 
As a result, the relation between trade reform and the damages from IS in the one-way trade 
(OWT) model is characterized by equation (6) but with * 0Qτ =  or vanishing. Subscript OWT 
denotes the special case: 
(9) [ ] [ ]*( ) ( ) ( ) *OWT Q YdED F Q F Y Yτ τ τρ κ τ ρ κ τ κ τ= − + − + − ( )* Q Y yc F k F bκ τ ρ ρ= − − . 
Hence, ( )0 * 0OWT Q Y ydED c F k F bκ τ ρ ρ> >⇔ − −< < . 
                                                          
5 This situation can be justified (i) if Home products do not generate any utility to the foreign consumers and hence 
the foreign utility is of the form 2* ** ( *) * 0.5 *y yu y A y B y= − ; or (ii) if foreign purchasers do want to consume 
Home products, but their demand is not high enough to be realized (i.e., *xa  is so small that * 0x ≤ ). 
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Comparing  (6) and (9), we see that [ ]*( ) *OWT QdED dED F Qτρ κ τ= + − , with 
[ ]*( ) *QF Qτρ κ τ−  positive (negative) under augmented (diminished) damages. Note that it is 
legitimate to compare the two conditions for two-way and one-way trade. With two-way trade 
we have *Q X Xτ τ τ= + , with the subscript indicating the derivative with respect to τ; we know 
that * / 0X τ∂ ∂ =  in the two-way trade or vanishes in the one-way-trade case. The two expected 
damages have to be compared at similar initial levels of damage and incidence. For completeness 
of the result, we compare the likelihood for all kind of damages, although augmented damages 
are considered to be the most relevant ones. Since in the two-way trade case, 
*/ * 0xQ cbτ∂ ∂ = − < , but with * 0Qτ =  or vanishing under one-way trade, we get the following 
result. 
Result 3: If the damages are 
augmented
neutral
diminished
⎞⎛ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 then trade integration is 
morelikely
equally likely
less likely
⎞⎛ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 to 
increase the expected damages in a two-way-trade cum multilateral integration context than in a 
one-way-trade cum unilateral trade opening case.  
Finally, we compare the underlying condition for the two-way trade and the one-way 
trade framework by looking back at equation (6). We observe the following:  
(i) In the two-way trade framework, production Q falls with the Home tariff falling through cross 
price effect k. A difference from the one-way trade framework is that this change in Q through 
demand is not equal to the corresponding change in Q in HOS (via own price). HOS would 
predict a larger contraction of output in absolute value. 
(ii) The change in imports, which increases the risk of IS through own-price effect yb , is as in 
the HOS case. 
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(iii) There is a production expansion by way of export expansion, which is through *xb . This is 
due to the tariff decrease in the rest of the world or integration in the context of two-way trade. 
4. Extensions 
Market structure  
One may argue that agricultural trade is rather imperfectly competitive. For example, Schmitz 
and Furtan show the oligopolistic nature of wheat trade. We want to investigate the implication 
of imperfect competition on the interface between integration and IS damages. We will show that 
market structure is not critical to deriving our analytical results. The qualitative results of the 
paper do not change under the imperfect competition set-up. 
 The basic model presented in the previous section is now modified to incorporate firms’ 
market power. Assume that there is one firm in each country instead of one industry. Assume 
further that firms compete in prices against each other in the two markets. The markets are 
segmented. The demands as specified in equations (1)-(4) remain the same. The constant unit 
cost structure remains unchanged, too.6 Home firm and Foreign firm regard each country as a 
separate market and therefore choose to maximize their profits by making price discrimination of 
the third degree. Home and Foreign firms’ problems are 
(10) [ ] ( ) ( )
*
* * *
. . .{ , }
( , ) , (1 ) * (1 *),
x x
x x y x x y
w r t p p
Max p p c x p p p c x p pπ τ τ τ⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦G G ,  
and 
(11) ( ) ( )
*
* * *
. . .{ , }
*( , ) * , (1 ) * * (1 *),
y y
y x y y x y
w r t p p
Max p p c y p p p c y p pπ τ τ τ⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= − + + − +⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦G G , 
respectively, where * *( , , , )x x y yp p p p p=G , ( , *)τ τ τ=G . This setting is similar to the “reciprocal 
                                                          
6 Results remain the same if the fixed costs are taken into account. Hence, for the sake of simplicity, we do not 
introduce the fixed costs in the model. 
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dumping” model of Brander and Krugman, except that these authors worked with homogenous 
goods and did not introduce trade policies into the analysis. The Home firm’s best responses are 
(12) [ ]{ }( ) (1 ) / 2Hx y x x y xBR p a b c k p bτ= + + + ,  
and 
(13) { }* * * * * *( ) (1 *) * / 2 (1 *)Hx y x x y xBR p a b c k p bτ τ⎡ ⎤= + + + +⎣ ⎦ . 
The Foreign firm’s best responses are 
(14) { }( ) * (1 ) / 2 (1 )Fy x y y x yBR p a b c kp bτ τ⎡ ⎤= + + + +⎣ ⎦ ,  
and 
(15) { }* * * * * *( ) * * (1 *) / 2Fy x y y x yBR p a b c k p bτ⎡ ⎤= + + +⎣ ⎦ . 
Equilibrium in the two countries’ markets can be solved independently. That is, equations (12) 
and (14) simultaneously define the equilibrium prices in the Home markets ( ),x yP P , and 
equations (13) and (15) simultaneously define the equilibrium prices in the Foreign markets 
( )* *,x yP P . Appendix 2 establishes the existence and uniqueness of the Bertrand equilibrium in 
our model; two-way trade exists given arbitrary trade and agricultural policies.  
 Home and Foreign equilibrium quantities consumed for both goods are represented by the 
corresponding capital letters with a hat to indicate the imperfect competition setup. They are  
(16) { }2ˆ ( ) 2 ( 2 ) *(1 )x x y y x y ybX a b ka c k b b kb cVτ τ= + + − + + ,  
(17) { }2ˆ( ) 2 *( 2 )(1 )y y x x x x ybY a b ka ckb c k b bVτ τ= + + + − + , 
(18) { }2* * * * * * *ˆ *( *) 2 * * * ( * 2 )(1 *)*x x y y y x ybX a b k a c k b c k b bVτ τ= + + + − + ,  
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and 
(19) { }* 2* * * * * *ˆ *( *) 2 * * (1 *) *( * 2 )*y y x x x x ybY a b k a ck b c k b bVτ τ= + + + + − ,  
with 2 2* *4  and * 4 *x y x yV b b k V b b k≡ − ≡ − . Home equilibrium production is 
ˆ ˆ ˆ( , *) ( ) *( *)Q X Xτ τ τ τ= + . 
 The comparative statics are derived in Appendix 3. It is obvious that the signs of the 
comparative statics still hold in the imperfect competition set-up, although the magnitude differs 
from those obtained under perfect competition. Appendix 4 provides a comparison of the 
magnitude of comparative statics under two alternative market structures. Because firms use 
their market power, decreases in distortions induce smaller changes in equilibrium variables in 
absolute value under imperfect competition. However, the qualitative results of the paper do not 
change with the imperfect competition set-up. Hence, the findings do not hinge on assuming a 
particular market structure. Note that it is also reasonable to establish a one-way trade Bertrand 
competition model, which is represented by equations (1), (3), and (4), since, as shown in 
Appendix 5, the Bertrand equilibrium exists and is unique in this one-way trade system. 
Market structure and feedback in production 
The model with market structure presented in the previous section is in the context of “diffuse” 
externality; therefore, we assume that firms do not observe damages caused by the IS 
introductions. That means there is no feedback on the industry or firm cost, because the 
externality could affect another agent (e.g., the consumer’s valuation of IS). However, in the 
strategic framework it is plausible to assume that firms observe the expected damages. To have 
any relevance this assumes that ED  translates into a loss of yield and hence a cost increase. The 
  
 
17
unit cost of production of the Home firm is assumed to be c β+  where yβ δ=  reflects the 
feedback of externality in the cost of production. 
 The best responses of the Foreign firm remain the same as reported in equations (14) and 
(15). However, the best responses of the Home firm change. The new best responses of the 
Home firm are 
(12’) ** *
* * *
( 1) ( )
( , , ) / 2 ( 1)
[ ( 1)] * *
x x y xH
x y x y x
x y y y x x
a k b c a ka
BR p p p b k
b b k k p kk p kb p
δ δ δ δδ δ τ δ τ δ
− − + + +⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪= −⎨ ⎬+ − + −⎪ ⎪⎩ ⎭
,  
and 
(13’) * * * * * *( , , ) * * ( ) / 2 *
H
x x y y x y x y x y y xBR p p p a k p b c a k p b t p bτ α α α τ⎡ ⎤= + + + + −⎣ ⎦ . 
Note that the system characterized by equations (12’), (13’), (14), and (15) is no longer separable 
as it was. That is, the properties that equations (12) and (14) define equilibrium prices ( , )x yp p , 
and equations (13) and (15) define equilibrium prices * *( , )x yp p  no longer hold for equations 
(12’) and (13’). The system is solved and used for calibration in the next section. 
5. Calibration of the wheat model in the presence of IS risk 
We calibrate the analytical model using data on wheat production and trade and plausible 
assumptions on IS associated with wheat for the three-country case (the United States, Canada, 
and the rest of the world [ROW]), with a vector of exports and imports for each country since 
there are several partners for each country. Wheat is assumed to be differentiated; hence, we 
have three kinds of wheat: US wheat, Canadian wheat, and ROW wheat. 
Data for production, consumption, and trade were gathered from the World Grain 
Statistics of the International Grains Council for the year 2001/02. Price data were obtained from 
the USDA, Attaché Reports, AgCanada, and the International Grains Councils. The protection 
data were collected from the OECD and WITS. Trade costs including trade barriers, 
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transportation costs and others, are assumed to be 70% for the United States, 60% for Canada, 
and 40% for ROW. These costs are treated as additive to tariffs and enter the model under the 
same parameter τ in the analytical model.  
Costs of production are assumed to be flat in all countries, which are $100/mt for the 
United States and Canada, and $110/mt for ROW. In addition, the feedback of imports on cost of 
the US is assumed to be 0.001.7 Fixed costs are assumed to be zero for the long-term version of 
the model. US exports to Canada are negligible compared with the other trade flows. Hence, we 
assume that there are no US exports to Canada in the simulation. Our target is to calibrate 23 
demand parameters of the system, then use them to simulate important variables of the model. 
Eight demands (three for the United States, two for Canada, and three for ROW), which 
are demands for the three-country model version of equations (1) through (4) specified in the 
previous section, are used for calibration.8 Eight best responses, which are the three-country 
model version of equations (7) through (10), are also taken into the calibration procedure. 
Additional information is gathered by assuming specific conditions for integrability of the 
demand system. That is, all Hessian matrices are guaranteed to be negative definite by strict 
equalities for determinants of leading principal minors.  
For IS damages, we assume that the rate of successful introduction to the United States is 
linear in total imports with an intercept and the slope set to 0.05. We simulate the change in 
imports and production of the United States under trade integration together with the change in 
expected damages to the United States created by the exotic species. Trade integration is 
calibrated at a fixed level of 20% tariff reduction. We contrast results in the multilateral trade 
                                                          
7 The feedback effect of IS damages on costs is through the parameter δ=0.001. The Home firm’s cost is  
( )c y zδ+ +  where c=100. Note that imports y and z are scaled down by 10,000 to get convergence. 
8 Demand system specification is provided in Appendix 6. 
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integration scenario in which all countries reduce tariffs with unilateral trade integration in which 
only a single country lowers its tariffs. 
Results are reported in Table 6. The second column shows that in the multilateral 
integration scenario, the United States increases imports from Canada by 1.24% and those from 
ROW by 1.83%. Production increases slightly, which leads to an increase in expected IS 
damages of 0.26% in the United States. This result is consistent with the analytical findings. 
Column 3 reflects results when the United States reduces tariffs unilaterally by 20%. This 
scenario yields the Costello and McAusland result: imports increase while production decreases; 
therefore, trade integration lowers the expected IS damages in the country. It is worth noting that 
we reproduce the Costello and McAusland result in a two-way trade context but with unilateral 
reform. This fact suggests that the multilateral trade integration/liberalization is the pivotal 
feature in our application that eradicates the possibility of the counterintuitive outcome of 
decreased IS damages with lower tariffs. The feedback effects of imports on US production yield 
results appear in columns 4 and 5. Results in column 5 are obtained from the scenario in which 
ROW reduces tariffs unilaterally by 20%. If there were no feedback on US production, there 
would be no change in US imports from ROW and from Canada. In the presence of the second-
round feedback, US imports from both ROW and Canada are affected by this unilateral tariff 
reduction of ROW. In fact, US imports from ROW and Canada decrease by 3.07% and 2.07%, 
respectively. US production and expected damages increase by 2.42% and 2.01%, respectively, 
which would also be expected in the situation in which the second-round feedback is absent. 
Results in column 4 stress the second-round feedback in the model. Since Canadian imports from 
the US are assumed to be negligible, if there were no second-round feedback, then when Canada 
unilaterally reduces tariffs by 20% there would be no effects on the US economy. However, in 
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the presence of these effects, this unilateral tariff generates a reduction in US imports from both 
Canada and ROW and an increase in production and hence in total expected damages, similar to 
the situation when ROW unilaterally reduces its tariff. 
6. Conclusions 
The world has been experiencing dramatic trade integration in the last 25 years following 
numerous regional and multilateral trade agreements and because natural protection provided by 
trade costs has been decreasing substantially. These changes are more recent for some 
agricultural trade but qualitatively similar: agricultural tariffs and trade costs have been falling 
and will continue to do so. Natural protection, including transportation costs, information costs, 
and security barriers for rich countries, remains significant. How further reduction of trade 
protection and trade cost will influence associated IS damages is a relevant and important issue. 
Our paper provides a step toward a better understanding of this complex interaction between IS 
damages and trade integration. 
In a one-way trade, homogenous-good world, it is quite possible that unilateral trade 
opening reduces the expected damages from IS in importable sectors. When accounting for joint 
reduction of protection or trade integration and two-way trade of differentiated products, this 
outcome is still possible but unlikely. In this more realistic situation, IS damages induced by 
trade integration are much more likely to increase because production does not have to fall as 
imports increase. Furthermore, the findings are robust to variation in market structures (perfect 
competition or oligopoly).  
The paper could be extended in a number of ways. Agriculture in OECD countries is 
characterized by heavy subsidies, which have, to some extent, substituted for the lower border 
protection (OECD). Since 1996, these subsidies have been slowly reduced as part of the Uruguay 
  
 
21
Round Agreement on Agriculture. The current Doha round is also considering further reduction 
in production subsidies in agriculture. One could consider this second-best dimension of 
domestic subsidies in integrated markets and their role on IS risk introduction and damages. 
Another extension would take into account the endogeneity of trade protection in a political 
economy setting: What would happen if tariff decreases were offset by other kinds of protection? 
Elucidating these issues would further improve our understanding of the interface between IS 
damage and trade. 
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Table 1: Trade in all wheat (including durum wheat), wheat flour, and semolina 
metric tons (wheat equivalent) 
Exporting Country  
Importing 
Country Canada 
United 
States Others Total 
Canada   25,486 77,956 103,442 
United 
States 1,910,964  48,032 1,958,996 
Others 14,182,058 26,764,197  40,946,255 
Total a 16,093,022 26,789,683 125,988 43,008,693 
Source: Wheat and Coarse Grains Shipments 2001/2002, International Grains Council. 
a This is the total of world wheat trade excluding transactions where either the US or Canada is a 
trader. The actual total world wheat trade of this year is 108,645,553 mt. 
 
 
Table 2: Trade in Coarse Grains (corn, barley, sorghum, oats, rye, millet, and trinicale) 
metric tons 
Exporting Country Importing 
Country Canada 
United 
States Others Total 
Canada   3,651,002 35,090 3,686,092 
United 
States 1,795,701  556,721 2,352,422 
Others 740,333 52,877,207  53,617,540 
Total a 2,536,034 56,528,209 591,811 59,656,054 
Source: Wheat and Coarse Grains Shipments 2001/2002, International Grains Council. 
a This is the total of world coarse grains trade excluding transactions where either the US or Canada 
is a trader. The actual total world coarse grain trade of this year is 105,609,043 MT. 
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Table 3: US Wheat Tariffs 
Tariff Item Description 
1980- 
1987 Unit              
 
Wheat and 
meslin                
130.63/66 Feed 5 %              
130.70 Food 0.21 $/bu              
                 
                 
HSNo Description  1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Unit
MFN Tariff                 
1001 
Wheat and 
meslin 
 
              
10011000 Durum wheat  0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0075 0.0073 0.0071 0.0069 0.0067 0.0065 $/kg
100190 
Other wheat and 
meslin 
 
              
10019010 Seed  6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 5.7 5.1 4.6 4.0 3.4 2.8 % 
10019020 Other  0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.007 0.0063 0.0056 0.0049 0.0042 0.0035 $/kg
Tariffs facing 
Canada  
 
              
1001 
Wheat and 
meslin 
 
              
10011000 Durum wheat  0.0077 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0 0 0 $/kg
100190 
Other wheat and 
meslin 
 
              
10019010 Seed  6.3 5.6 5.0 4.4 3.7 3.1 2.5 1.80 1.20 0.60 0 0 0 % 
10019020 Other  0.0077 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.001 0 0 0 0 $/kg
Source: USDA. 
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Table 4: Canadian Wheat Tariffs 
Canadian MFN wheat tariffs before Uruguay Round and US-Canada FTA tariffs 
 Unit 1980-1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
MFN wheat tariff Can$/ton 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 4.41 3.99 3.57 3.16 2.74
Wheat tariff faced by the 
United States Can$/ton 4.41 3.97 3.53 3.09 2.65 2.22 1.78 1.32 0.88 0.44 0.00
 
Canadian wheat tariff cutting commitments under the Uruguay Round 
BaseTariff Bound Tariffs 
Description TRQ Unit 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Durum wheat Within access Can$/ton 4.41 3.99 3.57 3.16 2.74 2.32 1.90 
Durum wheat Over access % 57.70 56.25 54.80 53.35 51.90 50.45 49.00 
Wheat, other than durum Within access Can$/ton 4.41 3.99 3.57 3.16 2.74 2.32 1.90 
Wheat, other than durum Over access % 90.00 87.75 85.50 83.25 81.00 78.75 76.50 
Source: USDA. 
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Table 5: Economic Impacts of Wheat Pests and Insects in the United States  
Name 
(economic 
importance) 
1.Seedborne 
2. Incidence 
3.Transmission 
4.Treatment 
 
Notes 
 
Economic Impacts (in yield loss given infected) 
Russian 
wheat aphid 
 First found in 1912 in Russia. 
Since its appearance in Texas 
in 1986, it has become a major 
pest of wheat and barley in the 
US. 
It causes over $850 million in direct and indirect losses from 1987-1992 for all US. 
During 1992/93 cropping season, over 7 million acres (20%) of dryland winter wheat and 
1 million acres (33%) of barley were infested throughout the western USA. 
In Canada, yield losses ranging from 25%-37% without insecticide treatment in field 
trials. 
wheat 
spindle 
streak 
mosaic virus 
 First described in 1927 in 
Japan, 
1960 in Ontario Canada 
In north central and northeastern US, the infection resulted in yield loss as high as 24%-
64% (according to studies in 1974, 1980, 1988, 1992). 
Hessian fly  Accidentally introduce to the 
US from Europe by Hessian 
troops at the time of 
Revolutionary War 
In Indiana alone over the period 1929-1936: 2 millions bushels/year and similar losses 
occur in other states. 
In 1945, which was the last year of general distribution of susceptible wheat varieties, the 
overall loss was about $37 million compared with average losses of about $16 
million/year in the 1980s. 
glume blotch 
(moderate) 
  In 1965, average yearly losses in the USA were 1%. 
A study in 1981 considered annual losses in the US to range between 1-7%.  
yellow rust 
(moderate) 
1.Low 
2.Not recorded 
3.Yes 
Mountainous and upland area According to a study in 1964 using glasshouse experiments in US, maximum yield 
reductions of 64.5% were recorded when the top two leaves and the ear of wheat were 
severely infected. 
Using field trials, studies in 1963 and 1964 report a maximum yield loss of about 30% on 
the most susceptible cultivar, Westmont. 
septoria leaf 
blotch 
(moderate) 
1.Low 
2.Not recorded 
3.Yes 
 Yield losses of up to 50% were reported in 1978 for the US. In Illinois, the losses were 
15%-20% in winter wheat trials in 1974-75.  
scab 
(moderate) 
1.Moderate 
2.Yes 
3.Yes 
Scab is not a new disease in the 
US. Damages were already 
reported in 1917. 
In 1917, 31 of 40 states that were surveyed reported damage from scab with losses 
estimated at 288,000 mt, primarily from the winter wheat areas of Ohio, Indiana, and 
Illinois. In 1919, losses were estimated at 2.18 million mt throughout the US. 
Losses for all US were 4% in 1982. A major epidemic affected 4 million hectares of the 
spring wheat and barley growing area of the northern Great Plains of North and South 
Dakota and Minnesota. Yield losses exceed 6.5 million tons worth, $826 million, 
although total losses associated with the epidemic approached $1 billion. In subsequent 
years, losses in theses states have been estimated at $200-$400 million annually. In the 
winter wheat growing states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, and Illinois, losses were in 
excess of $300 million in 1995 and 1996.  
stern rust of 
cereals 
 Most important disease of 
wheat until 1950s when the use 
of resistant cultivars became 
widespread 
Losses in North Dakota, during the severe epidemics of 1935 and 1954, were estimated at 
$356 and $260 million, respectively, based on wheat prices in late 1995. 
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karnal bunt 
of wheat 
(moderate) 
1.low 
2.Not Recorded 
3.Yes 
First reported in 1909 in 
Pakistan; formally recorded in 
1930 near the north Indian city 
of Karnal; Very recently found 
in southwestern US. 
In Mexico where karnal bunt appears regularly, direct losses are not very significant and 
do not exceed 1%, but indirect costs to Mexican economy are higher because of 
quarantine measures that have to be applied for grain exports.  
leaf spot of 
wheat 
(moderate) 
1.Low 
2.Yes 
3.Yes 
 
 The first occurrence was reported in North Dakota in 1971. Yield losses range from 8% 
to 28% .A study in 1974 reported an average loss of 12.9% in grain yield and 1% 
reduction in test weight in damp weather, and no losses under dry conditions.  
In Montana, a study in 1976 recorded losses of up to 19.7% in 1000-kernel weight in 
evaluation of 30 cultivars in artificially inoculated small plots.  
In Kansas, a study in 1985 obtained yield losses of 27% . 
In Oklahoma, a study in 1999 reported a yield loss of 15% in untreated field plots.  
wheat stem 
sawfly 
 Important consistent pest in 
northern Great Plains of North 
America 
The losses are up to 25% less grain. Grain quality is also reduced. Damage occurs 
consistently and annually. Damage is greatest in Alberta, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, 
Montana, and North Dakota. 
rown rust 
(high) 
1.Not Recorded 
2.Not Recorded 
3.Yes 
First reported in 1926, now 
widespread in the US 
Generally, it is capable of causing 35%-50% loss in endemic area.  
Between 1973 and 1975, nearly 4.1 million tons of wheat were lost to this rust in 
Oklahoma and Kansas. In Kansas in 1985, 1986, and 1987, losses due to the rust were 
5%, 9%, and 4%, respectively.  
green bug 
(spring grain 
aphid) 
 Greatest impact on winter 
wheat production in the 
southern great plains of the US 
Millions of acres killed in outbreak years (before the use of organic insecticide). 
orange 
wheat 
blossom 
midge 
 
 Accidentally introduced and 
well established for long in 
Canada and the US. First 
discovered near Quebec in 
1828 and by 1854, spread into 
the US. 
In Canada, an important breakout began in 1983 when yield losses in northeastern 
Saskatchewan were estimated at 30% (value at $30 million), and in 1984 some areas of 
northwestern Manitoba reported grain losses as high as 26%.  
In the US, losses have generally been less marked, although a 40% loss of yield was 
reported on spring-sown wheat in the Pacific Northwest in 1945. 
dwarf bunt 
of wheat 
(low) 
1.Low 
2.Yes 
3.Yes 
Since 1974, the export of wheat 
from Pacific Northwest ports to 
China has been halted as China 
has prohibited the intro. Of 
grain carrying dwarf bunt. 
In Oregon, in 1952-1953, dwarf bunt destroyed 50%-90% of the seed in several 1-year-
old fields.  
 
common 
bunt 
(high) 
 
2.High 
3.Yes 
4.Yes 
 
Potentially important damages, 
but readily controlled with 
chemical treatment. Now 
disease is rare or minor. 
 
Untreated, common bunt can destroy more than 50% of grain, but losses are usually 5%-
10%. 
flag smut 
(low) 
1.Low 
2.Yes 
3.Yes 
 In the early 1960s, flag smut of wheat occurred in several counties of Washington state 
and Oregon, where the incidence varied from trace levels to about 30%. The disease was 
destructive in localized areas in south-central and southeastern Washington.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative percentage decrease in US rail rates between 1981 and 2000,  
relative to 1981 
 
Source: Bitzan et al.. 
 
Figure 2: World transportation costs as measured by CIF/FOB ratios 
 
Source: Hummels 1999. 
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Table 6: Simulated change in imports, production, and expected damages of the US 
 
0.7 ( ), * 0.6 ( ), ** 0.4 ( )US Canada ROWτ τ τ= = =  
Unilateral Trade Integration, 0.2κ =  Changes in Trade Flows 
Production and 
Damages (1) 
Multilateral 
Trade 
Integration (2), 
0.2κ =  
* ** 0d dτ τ= =  
(US reduces tariff) 
(3) 
* 0d dτ τ= =  
(CAN reduces tariff) 
(4) 
** 0d dτ τ= =  
(ROW reduces 
tariff) (5) 
Imports from Canada 
Imports from ROW 
Production 
Expected damages 
+ 1.24 % 
+ 1.83 % 
+ 0.02 % 
+ 0.26 % 
+ 1.24 % 
+ 1.83 % 
- 0.27 % 
- 0.03 % 
- 2.07 % 
- 3.07 % 
+ 2.12 % 
+ 1.72 % 
- 2.07 % 
-3.07 % 
+ 2.42 % 
+ 2.01 % 
Appendix  
Appendix 1: 
The inverse demands corresponding to equations (1)-(2) are 
  ( , )x x xp x y A B x Ky= − − , and ( , )y y yp x y A B y Kx= − − . 
All parameters are positive and so is expression 2xB B K−y . This demand system can be derived 
by maximizing quasi-linear utility, subject to the budget constraint, X YI z p x p y= + + , where I is 
Home income. The aggregate utility function is of the form ( , )U z u x y= + , where z is the 
aggregate consumption of a competitive numéraire good and u is a quadratic function defined by 
   2 2( , ) 0.5( 2 )x y x yu x y A x A y B x B y Kxy= + − + + . 
Appendix 2:  
Existence and uniqueness of a Bertrand equilibrium in the model. 
Given the demand structure as specified in equations (1)-(4), we show that the Bertrand 
equilibrium of the game exists and is unique for any ad valorem tariffs ( , *)τ τ .  
Proof: Rewrite the Foreign firm’s best response ( )Fy xBR p  under the form ( )
F
x yBR p ; that is, 
(14’)   { }( ) * 2 (1 ) /Fx y y y y yBR p a b c b p kτ⎡ ⎤= − + + +⎣ ⎦ . 
The two best responses ( )Hx yBR p  and ( )
F
x yBR p  are two linear functions of yp . One sees that  
/ (1 ) / 2 2 (1 ) / /H Fx y x y x yBR p k b b k BR pτ τ∂ ∂ = + > + =∂ ∂ . 
On the other hand,  
[ ]0 0/ 2 0 * (1 ) /y yH Fx p x x x y y x pBR a b c b a b c k BRτ= =⎡ ⎤≡ + > >− + + ≡⎣ ⎦ . 
Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium in the Home market, which is represented by the intersection 
point of these two linear correspondences, always exists and is unique. Similar argument holds 
for the equilibrium in the Foreign market.   Q.E.D. 
Appendix 3:  
By equations (16a)-(16d), we have 
(i) ˆ * / 0X τ∂ ∂ = , * 2* *ˆ * / * (2 * ) / * 0x x yX b c b b k Vτ∂ ∂ = − − < ; 
(ii) ˆ / * / 0x yX c b b k Vτ∂ ∂ = > , ˆ / * 0X τ∂ ∂ = ; 
(iii) ˆ / * / 0x yQ c b b k Vτ∂ ∂ = > , 2* * *ˆ / * (2 * ) / * 0x x yQ cb b b k Vτ∂ ∂ = − − < .  
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(iv) 2ˆ / * (2 ) / 0y x yY c b b b k Vτ∂ ∂ = − − < , ˆ / * 0Y τ∂ ∂ = .  
Appendix 4:  
Comparative statics results under perfect competition can be compared to that under imperfect 
competition reported in Appendix 3 as follows: 9 
(i) ˆ * / * /X Xτ τ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ , ˆ * / * * / *X Xτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ ; 
(ii) ˆ / /X Xτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ , ˆ / * / *X Xτ τ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ ; 
(iii) ˆ / /Q Qτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ , ˆ / * / *Q Qτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ .  
(iv) ˆ / /Y Yτ τ∂ ∂ < ∂ ∂ , ˆ / * / *Y Yτ τ∂ ∂ = ∂ ∂ . 
Appendix 5:  
Existence and uniqueness of a Bertrand Equilibrium in one-way trade model. 
Home firm chooses the price level ( xp ), and foreign firm decides 
*( , )y yp p  to maximize its 
profits. Given the demand structure as specified in equations (1), (2), and (8), the Bertrand 
equilibrium of the game exists and is unique for any ad valorem tariffs ( , *)τ τ .  
Proof: Expressing the Home and the Foreign firm’s best response under the form ( )x yp p , we 
have [ ]{ }( ) (1 ) / 2Hx y x x y xBR p a b c k p bτ= + + + , and { }( ) * 2 (1 ) /Fx y y y y yBR p a b c b p kτ⎡ ⎤= − + + +⎣ ⎦ . 
The same argument holds as in Appendix 1. Hence, the Bertrand equilibrium in the Home 
market, which is represented by the intersection point of these two linear correspondences, 
always exists and is unique. 
The equilibrium price in the Foreign market is determined solely by the Foreign firm. That is, 
* * * ** / 2y y y yP a b c b⎡ ⎤= +⎣ ⎦ , which obviously always exists and is unique. 
Appendix 6:  
Calibrated demand system. 
Three US demands for three types of wheat are specified as the following: 
                                                          
9 These expressions can be obtained after some simple derivations using 24 x yV b b k= −  and 2* ** 4 *x yV b b k= − , and 
the assumption that { }* *min , *or x y x yb b b b k k> , which was imposed in the basic model to guarantee integrability 
of demand system.  
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x x x y zx a b p kp hp= − + + , y x y y zy a kp b p gp= + − + , and y x y z zz a hp gp b p= + + − . 
Two Canada demands for Canada and ROW wheat are as the following: 
* * * * ** * *y x y y zy a k p b p g p= + − + , and * * * * ** * *z x y z zz a h p g p b p= + + − . 
And three ROW demands for three types of wheat are 
** ** ** ** **** ** **x x x y zx a b p k p h p= − + + , ** ** ** ** **** ** **y x y y zy a k p b p g p= + − + , and 
** ** ** ** **** ** **
z x y z z
z a h p g p b p= + + − . 
 
 
